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SECTION 1 OF 3

/***** THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE *****/

BODY

SUBJ: IIR 7 931 0935 04/IRAQ - **BIOGRAPHICAL** INFORMATION ON CIVILIANS
AND REG [REDACTED] SUSPECTED OF WAR CRIMES (U)

WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED
INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(b)(3):50 USC
403-1(i)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20030409.

[REDACTED]

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) SUMMARY: (C [REDACTED]) **BIOGRAPHICAL** INFORMATION ON TEN IRAQI MILITARY OR
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SUSPECTED OF WAR CRIMES--ABD AL GHAFAR; ABDULLAH;
ABBAS; MUHAMMAD; AHMAD; KHALIFA; ABDUL RASHID; SABAH; HAMZA, AND
JAWAD.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) TEXT: 1. (C [REDACTED]) RUKAN RAZUKI ((ABD AL GHAFAR)) SULAYMAN AL NASIRI.
AL-GHAFAR WAS A CAPTAIN WHO WAS RELATED TO SADDAM ((HUSSEIN)) AND
ONE OF HUSSEIN'S GUARDS UNTIL 1995. IN 1991, HE EXECUTED AN
OPERATION AGAINST THE INSURGENTS IN COLLABORATION WITH MOHAMMED
HAMZA ((AL-ZUBAIDI)). AFTER UNDERGOING DANDGEROUS SURGERY ON HIS

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HEAD, AL-GHAFAR'S HEALTH WAS NOT GOOD, SO HE COULD NOT CONTINUE AS HUSSEIN'S GUARD. AFTER THAT HE WAS DIRECTOR OF THE TRIBAL OFFICE, HAVING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS BETWEEN IRAQI TRIBAL LEADERS. SOME MILITARY OFFICERS SERVED AS HIS DEPUTIES. HE STAYED IN THAT POSITION UNTIL OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

HE IS FROM TIKRIT. HUSSEIN'S RELATIVES ARE FROM THE SAME TRIBE. HE LIVES IN BAGHDAD BECAUSE HE IS UNPOPULAR).

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

2. (C) KAMAL MUSTAFA ((ABDULLAH)) SULTAN AL-TIKRITI. ABDULLAH IS A LIEUTENANT GENERAL (LTG) AND CORPS COMMANDER IN THE REPUBLICAN GUARD (RG). HE IS THE BROTHER OF A (LNU) WHO IS HUSSEIN'S SON-IN-LAW. ABDULLAH IS VERY CLOSE TO HUSSEIN AND FROM THE SAME TRIBE. HE THEN BECAME A RG CORPS COMMANDER. HE IS WEALTHY, POPULAR, AND HUSSEIN LOVES HIM.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

3. (C) LTG SA'ADI TUAMA ((ABBAS)) AL-JABOORI. ABBAS WAS A DIVISION COMMANDER DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN AND THEN BECAME DEFENSE MINISTER IN 1991. AFTER A SHORT TIME, HE WAS DISMISSED AND THEN BECAME MINISTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS FOR ABOUT THREE YEARS, AFTER WHICH HE RETIRED. ABBAS IS ORIGINALLY FROM BAGHDAD AND CURRENTLY LIVES THERE.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

4. (C) LTG HUSSEIN RASHID ((AL-MUHAMMAD)) AL-TIKRITI. RASHID IS AN OFFICER FROM TIKRIT. HE WAS COMMANDER OF THE RG IN THE EARLY 1980'S, AND LATER BECAME A MEMBER OF THE GENERAL COMMAND OF ARMORED TROOPS. HE STAYED IN THAT POSITION UNTIL THE BEGINNING OF OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. WHEN IRAQ FORMED FOUR DEFENSIVE MILITARY REGIONS, HE BECAME DEPUTY FOR THE COMMANDER OF THE SOUTHERN SECTION. RASHID WAS ALI HASAN ((AL-MAJID'S)) DEPUTY IN BASRAH

RASHID LIVES IN BAGHDAD AND HIS SON WAS QUSAY HUSSEIN'S SECRETARY.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) 5. (C/ [REDACTED]) LTG SULTAN HASHIM AHMAD AL-JABBURI ((AL-TAI)). AL-TAI IS AN OFFICER FROM MOSUL (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) AND FROM A BIG TRIBE AROUND MOSUL CALLED THE TAY TRIBE. (FIELD COMMENT--TAY IS PRONOUNCED AS "TIE"). IN 1991, AL-TAI WAS THE CHIEF OF STAFF'S DEPUTY. ONE OF HIS MANY DUTIES WAS TO ARRANGE SOLDIERS' TRANSPORTATION WHEN THEY WENT ON VACATION. IN 1994, AL-TAI BECAME MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND REMAINED IN THIS POSITION UNTIL OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. HE SOMETIMES ATTENDED MEETINGS OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) --HE IS A VERY GOOD OFFICER AND TRUSTWORTHY, BUT DID NOT GET HIS COMPLETE CHANCE, BECAUSE HIS AUTHORITY WAS VERY LIMITED. THIS WAS DUE TO THE INTERVENTION OF QUSAY SADDAM ((HUSSEIN)). QUSAY WAS THE COMMANDER OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD, WHICH WAS SEPARATE FROM THE MILITARY. SADDAM HUSSEIN WOULD EVEN ASK QUSAY ABOUT THE MILITARY INSTEAD OF THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE).

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

AHMAD IS POPULAR WITH MOST OF THE OFFICERS. HE LIVES IN MOSUL AND HAS ANOTHER HOUSE IN BAGHDAD.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) 6. (C/ [REDACTED]) LTG AYAD FUTAYYIH ((KHALIFA)) AL-RAWI. AL-RAWI IS AN OFFICER FROM RAWA, AL-ANBAR PROVINCE. IN ABOUT 1985 OR BEFORE, HE BECAME COMMANDER OF THE RG DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN. AFTER THE LIBERATION OF AL-FAO FROM THE IRANIANS IN 1988, HE BECAME WELL-KNOWN. WHEN AL-RAWI MOVED FROM THE RG, HE BECAME GOVERNOR OF AT-TAMIM, IN KIRKUK (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i). IN THE 1990'S, HE WAS IN THAT POSITION FOR AT LEAST TWO YEARS. AFTER THAT, HE BECAME MINISTER OF SPORT AND YOUTH, AND A MEMBER OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR FOUR YEARS. HOWEVER, AL-RAWI'S ABILITY IN SPORT AND YOUTH WAS ONLY AVERAGE. AL-RAWI THEN BECAME THE COMMANDER OF AL-QUDS FORCE UNTIL OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM. THE AL-QUDS FORCE IS A CIVILIAN ORGANIZATION TRAINED ON LIGHT WEAPONS. AL-RAWI IS A VERY GOOD OFFICER WHO LIKES TO WORK ALOT. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) --SINCE HE IS NOT FROM TIKRIT, AL-RAWI COULD NOT GET GOOD OPPORTUNITIES NOR BE IN A GOOD POSITION. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) HE LIVES IN BAGHDAD IN AL KARKH AL HARATHIA.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) 7. (C/ [REDACTED]) LTG MAHER ((ABDUL RASHID)) AL-TIKRITI. ABDUL RASHID IS A MILITARY OFFICER FROM TIKRIT AND THE FATHER-IN-LAW OF QUSAY SADDAM HUSSEIN. IN 1988, DURING THE LIBERATION OF THE FAO PENINSULA ABDUL RASHID WAS THE COMMANDER OF THIRD CORPS AND PERFORMED A JOINT

ASSAULT WITH THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS UNDER HUSSEIN ((KAMEL)) WHO WAS ABDUL RASHID'S SUPERVISOR DURING THIS CAMPAIGN. ABDUL RASHID DID NOT RECEIVE A MEDAL OR COMMENDATION. IT WAS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT KAMEL HATED ABDUL RASHID AND DID NOT GIVE HIM A LAUDATORY REPORT FOR

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) A. (C) [REDACTED] ABDUL RASHID RETURNED TO THE MILITARY IN 1991 AS DID MANY OTHER RETIRED OFFICERS. IN 1991, ABDUL RASHID WAS FIRST IN HILLA / (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [REDACTED] FOLLOWING THIS ASSIGNMENT, ABDUL RASHID SERVED IN NORTHERN IRAQ UNDER IZZAT IBRAHIM ((AL-DURI)). FOLLOWING THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SHI'A INSURGENCE, ABDUL RASHID RETURNED TO HIS FARM WHERE THERE WERE FREQUENT REPORTS THAT HE OFTEN SPOKE POORLY OF SADDAM HUSSEIN. HOWEVER, ABDUL RASHID DID NOT REALLY HATE HUSSEIN, BUT RATHER HE RESENTED AND HATED MANY OF THOSE AROUND HUSSEIN. THIS ESPECIALLY INCLUDED ALI HASAN ((AL-MAJID)), AL-MAJID'S BROTHERS AND COUSINS, AS WELL AS HUSSEIN KAMEL AND IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI. [REDACTED]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

[REDACTED] BECAUSE OF ABDUL RASHID'S CRITICISM, HUSSEIN PUBLICLY ADMONISHED ABDUL RASHID IN FRONT OF A MEETING OF TRIBAL SHEIKHS AND LOCAL LEADERS IN TIKRIT. HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE WOULD GIVE ABDUL RASHID ONE MORE CHANCE. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) [REDACTED] -THIS WAS BECAUSE ABDUL RASHID WAS QUSAY SADDAM HUSSEIN'S FATHER-IN-LAW).

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) B. (C) [REDACTED] IN 2003, ABDUL RASHID CAME OUT OF RETIREMENT AGAIN, DUE TO THE WAR WITH THE COALITION. ABDUL RASHID WENT TO THE SOUTHERN MILITARY DISTRICT AND WAS THE DEPUTY COMMANDER TO AL-MAJID, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT HE HAD PROBLEMS WITH AL-MAJID AND WAS KNOWN FOR CRITICIZING HIM VIGOROUSLY. HOWEVER, NO ONE ACTUALLY TOLD ABDUL RASHID THAT HE WAS SUPPOSED TO BE AL-MAJID'S DEPUTY. ABDUL RASHID DID NOT KNOW HE WAS GOING TO BE AL-MAJID'S DEPUTY UNTIL HE RETURNED TO BAGHDAD FROM HIS SERVICE IN THE SOUTH. [REDACTED]

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

ABDUL RASHID WAS AN HONEST, GOOD SOLDIER WHO ALWAYS OPPOSED CORRUPTION AND PEOPLE WHO DID BAD THINGS.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) 8. (C) [REDACTED] LTG HISHAM ((SABAH)) AL-FAKHRI. SABAH IS AN ARMY OFFICER FROM MOSUL. SABAH HAD VERY GOOD RELATIONS WITH HUSSEIN, DATING BACK TO WHEN SABAH WAS A LIEUTENANT. SABAH WAS ALWAYS SOMETHING OF AN ASPIRANT. HE WANTED TO BE CLOSE TO HUSSEIN IN ORDER TO GET A GOOD POSITION. SABAH WAS ALSO GOOD FRIENDS WITH ADNAN FAIRKHALLA ((TARBAH)). SABAH WAS A CORPS COMMANDER WHO BECAME VERY FAMOUS DURING THE WAR WITH IRAN. SABAH IS FROM A VERY GOOD FAMILY, AND IS A

VERY GOOD SOLDIER.

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) A. (C) IN LATE 1991 OR EARLY 1992, SABAH BECAME THE GOVERNOR OF AT-TAMIM PROVINCE. AT THAT TIME, THERE WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM IN KIRKUK, WITH MANY INDIVIDUALS GRUMBLING ABOUT CERTAIN REGIME LEADERS WHO WERE CONTROLLING AND FARMING LAND THAT DID NOT REALLY BELONG TO THEM. SABAH INVESTIGATED THE MATTER AND MADE A FORMAL SITUATION REPORT. THE REPORT INCLUDED EIGHT OR NINE NAMES, INCLUDING SAYYID ((KHALAF)), WHO WAS AN AGENT OF ALI HASAN AL-MAJID, AND AN UNIDENTIFIED BROTHER OF IZZAT IBRAHIM AL-DURI. HUSSEIN HAD A MEETING WITH THE LEADERS OF THE BA'ATH PARTY AND PROVIDED EXCERPTS OF THE REPORT, INCLUDING ALL THE NAMES, TO ALL THE LEADERS. AL-MAJID AND AL-DURI WERE VERY UPSET BECAUSE THE REPORT IMPLICATED THEM OR THEIR FAMILIES.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) B. (C) HUSSEIN PROPOSED THE LEADERSHIP FORM A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE SITUATION, BUT AL-DURI OPPOSED THIS MEASURE. HUSSEIN THEN WENT TO SABAH, WHO TOLD HUSSEIN HE HAD BEEN A FRIEND FOR A LONG TIME, BUT HE, AS THE GOVERNOR, WAS NOT THE ONLY PERSON COMPLAINING. THE ENTIRE TOWN OF KIRKUK WAS UPSET ABOUT THE MATTER. SABAH OFFERED TO DROP THE COMPLAINT, BUT HUSSEIN INSISTED THERE WOULD IN FACT BE AN INVESTIGATION. THE ONLY PERSON SABAH TRUSTED TO CONDUCT THE INVESTIGATION WAS TAHA YASIN ((RAMADAN)), AND HUSSEIN AGREED TO APPOINT RAMADAN TO CONDUCT THE INVESTIGATION. HUSSEIN COULD NOT APPOINT SABAH TO HEAD THE INVESTIGATION, BECAUSE AL-DURI OR AL-MAJID WOULD HAVE PROBABLY HAD SABAH KILLED. HUSSEIN APPOINTED RAMADAN AS HEAD OF THE NORTHERN REGION OF THE BA'ATH PARTY, SO THAT HE WOULD HAVE A POSITION THAT JUSTIFIED RAMADAN AS THE INVESTIGATOR OF THE PROPERTY SITUATION IN KIRKUK. AL-MAJID OBJECTED, SUGGESTING THAT HUSSEIN APPOINT AL-DURI AS HEAD OF THE BA'ATH PARTY NORTHERN REGION. HUSSEIN DECLINED. SOME OF THE LEADERSHIP SUGGESTED HUSSEIN APPOINT MIZBAN ((KHUZR)) AL-HADI AS LEADER OF THE BA'ATH PARTY NORTHERN REGION AND HUSSEIN AGREED TO MAKE AL-HADI DEPUTY UNDER RAMADAN.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) C. (C) THE INVESTIGATING COMMISSION PROVED IN ABOUT TWO WEEKS THAT SABAH'S ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WAS COMPLETELY ACCURATE. AFTER THIS INCIDENT, SABAH BEGAN TO HAVE PROBLEMS WITH AL-MAJID AND AL-DURI. AL-MAJID GAVE A BAD REPORT REGARDING SABAH'S PERFORMANCE TO AL-DURI, AND EVENTUALLY THE ADMINISTRATION OF KIRKUK WAS PLACED DIRECTLY UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF AL-DURI, INSTEAD OF SABAH AS THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR. ONE TO TWO YEARS AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF THE INVESTIGATION, THE LANDS IN QUESTION WERE BACK UNDER THE CONTROL OF

THE PREVIOUSLY INVESTIGATED REGIME MEMBERS.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) D. (C) [REDACTED] IN 1997 OR 1998, SABAH DEVELOPED DIABETES AND WAS SENT TO AUSTRIA FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. SABAH HAD GANGRENE IN BOTH LEGS, WHICH WERE AMPUTATED. HUSSEIN DID NOT ORIGINALLY DISMISS SABAH FROM HIS POSITION AS GOVERNOR, BUT WANTED TO KEEP HIM ON BECAUSE OF HIS PAST SERVICE. HOWEVER, SABAH DECIDED IT WAS BETTER TO RETIRE INSTEAD OF TRYING TO SERVE IN HIS DEBILITATED STATE, AND SUBMITTED HIS RETIREMENT.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) 9. (C) [REDACTED] MUHAMMAD HAMZA ((AL-ZUBAYDI)). IN 1966 BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, AL-ZUBAYDI WAS ALREADY IN THE BA'ATH PARTY. AL-ZUBAYDI WAS A MEDIC FROM HILLAH WITH A VERY LIMITED EDUCATION. HE BECAME THE LEADER OF THE BA'ATH PARTY IN HILLAH. AL-ZUBAYDI BECAME WELL-KNOWN AFTER HE BEGAN TO ASSOCIATE WITH ALI HASAN AL-MAJID AND HUSSEIN KAMEL.

A. (C) [REDACTED] IN 1991, AL-ZUBAYDI WENT TO AN NASSIRIYAH (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [REDACTED] TO PUT DOWN THE SHI'A INSURGENCE. THERE WERE AMPLE REPORTS THAT HE KILLED MANY PEOPLE. THERE IS A VIDEO SHOWING HIM BEATING CIVILIANS. WHEN AL-ZUBAYDI RETURNED AFTER THE SUPPRESSION OF THE INSURGENCY, HUSSEIN KAMEL AND IZZAT AL-DURI WROTE HIM A GLOWING REPORT. MIZBAN KHUDR ((AL-HADI)), WHO WAS ALSO HIGHLY COMMENDED BY KAMEL AND AL-DURI FOR HIS ACTIONS DURING THE INSURGENCY, AND AL-ZUBAYDI BECAME MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMAND COUNCIL IN 1991. AL-ZUBAYDI ALSO RECEIVED THE RANK OF LTG, AND WAS HIGHLY DECORATED.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) B. (C) [REDACTED] IN SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER 1991, AL-MAJID RECOMMENDED AL-ZUBAYDI FOR THE POSITION OF PRIME MINISTER. MOST OF THE LEADERSHIP WAS SURPRISED AND SOME ARGUED AGAINST THE APPOINTMENT BECAUSE AL-ZUBAYDI WAS ALMOST ILLITERATE. HOWEVER, HUSSEIN APPOINTED AL-ZUBAYDI PRIME MINISTER TO SHOW HOW PLEASED HE WAS WITH AL-ZUBAYDI'S PERFORMANCE DURING THE INSURGENCY. AL-ZUBAYDI WAS PRIME MINISTER UNTIL AROUND THE END OF 1993, AND WAS ESSENTIALLY A JOKE. TARIQ ((AZIZ)) WAS AL-ZUBAYDI'S ASSISTANT. AZIZ AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT BEGAN TO HEAR VERY NEGATIVE REPORTS FROM ABROAD. IT WAS OBVIOUS TO THE LEADERS OF OTHER ARAB GOVERNMENTS WHERE AL-ZUBAYDI VISITED, THAT HE WAS PRACTICALLY ILLITERATE. WHEN THIS BECAME TOO MUCH OF AN EMBARRASSMENT FOR IRAQ, HUSSEIN REPLACED AL-ZUBAYDI. IN 1995, WHEN HUSSEIN HIMSELF TOOK ON THE POSITION OF PRIME MINISTER AND MADE AL-ZUBAYDI HIS DEPUTY. THIS WAS ESSENTIALLY A TITLE ONLY. AZIZ AND TAHA YASIN RAMADAN WERE ALSO DEPUTIES.

(b)(3):50 C. (C) [REDACTED] AZIZ WAS VERY BUSY WITH FOREIGN TRAVEL, ESPECIALLY TO ARAB COUNTRIES, SO AL-ZUBAYDI WENT ON A STATE VISIT TO TUNISIA,

MOROCCO, AND ALGERIA IN 1997 OR 1998. THE AMBASSADORS FROM THESE NATIONS COMPLAINED THAT AL-ZUBAYDI WAS UNQUALIFIED AND UNEDUCATED. AL-ZUBAYDI MET WITH THE PRESIDENT OF TUNISIA, ZINE AL ABIDINE ((BEN ALI)), BUT BEN ALI COMPLAINED THAT HE FOUND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND AL-ZUBAYDI. BEN ALI PREVIOUSLY HAD A RELATIONSHIP WITH RAMADAN, AND ASKED WHY RAMADAN HAD NOT COME INSTEAD OF AL-ZUBAYDI.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) D. (C) [REDACTED] AROUND THE YEAR 2000, AL-ZUBAYDI BEGAN TO SHOW SIGNS OF SENILITY AND BEGAN TO DEVELOP AN INCREASINGLY SEVERE MEMORY PROBLEM. HE ALSO UNDERWENT SEVERAL OPERATIONS. SINCE THIS TIME, AL-ZUBAYDI HAD NO RESPONSIBILITIES, BUT CONTINUED TO COLLECT HIS SALARY AS A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE BA'ATH PARTY. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) [REDACTED] -- AL-ZUBAYDI HAS RECENTLY BECOME MORE AND MORE SENILE, SOMETIMES FORGETTING HIS AGE).

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) 10. (C) [REDACTED] MUHAMMAD ((JAWAD)) ANEFEEES. ANEFEEES IS THE SHEIKH OF THE AL BUALWAN TRIBE. THIS TRIBE WAS ORIGINALLY FROM AL ANBAR PROVINCE, AND IS ALSO KNOWN AS THE AD DULEYM TRIBE. IN FACT, AL ANBAR PROVINCE WAS ALSO PREVIOUSLY KNOWN AS AD DULEYM PROVINCE. THE TRIBE IS ESPECIALLY PROMINENT IN FALLUJAH

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [REDACTED] AND AR RAMADI
[REDACTED] SOMETIME IN THE DISTANT PAST, ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THIS TRIBE LEFT THE TRADITIONAL AREA AND WENT TO THE BABIL (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [REDACTED] AREA. HE ESTABLISHED A VILLAGE KNOWN AS ALBUALWAN IN THE CITY OF MAHAWIL (b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) [REDACTED] VERY CLOSE TO HILLA. CURRENTLY, THERE ARE APPROXIMATELY 300 FAMILIES FROM THE ALBUALWAN TRIBE IN THIS AREA. THESE TRIBE MEMBERS ARE SHI'A, WHILE THOSE MEMBERS OF THE ALBUALWAN TRIBE WHO LIVE IN THEIR ORIGINAL HOMELAND IN AL-ANBAR PROVINCE ARE SUNNI. ANEFEEES WAS A GOVERNMENT SUPPORTER. ALTHOUGH A SHI'ITE, ANEFEEES WAS NOT PARTICULARLY POPULAR WITH OTHER SHI'A IN THE AREA, BECAUSE OF HIS CLOSE TRIBAL CONNECTIONS TO SUNNIS.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) A. (C) [REDACTED] DURING THE 1991 INSURRECTION, ANEFEEES WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFENDING HIS VILLAGE, HOLDING OFF THE INSURGENTS, AND SUCCESSFULLY STOPPING THEIR ADVANCE. WHEN TAHA YASIN RAMADAN VISITED THE AREA LATER IN 1991, HE STOPPED IN AND MET ANEFEEES. ANEFEEES TOLD RAMADAN THAT THE ARMY WAS NOT NEEDED IN THE AREA, AS HE AND HIS TRIBE COULD MAINTAIN ORDER.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) B. (C) [REDACTED] LATER, HUSSEIN MADE A TELEVISED VISIT TO ANEFEEES, WHO, BY NOW, WAS KNOWN FOR HIS HOSPITALITY. HUSSEIN GAVE ANEFEEES A CAR AND A PISTOL. (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c) [REDACTED] -- WHEN THE PRESIDENT VISITS SOMEONE LIKE THAT, THEY GAIN A LOT OF POWER). APPROXIMATELY ONE YEAR AFTER THE HUSSEIN VISIT, ANEFEEES TOLD RAMADAN THAT THERE WAS NO TELEPHONE SERVICE TO HIS VILLAGE. ANEFEEES ASKED IF SOMEONE COULD PUT IN A LINE

SO THAT HE COULD HAVE A TELEPHONE AT HIS HOUSE. RAMADAN AGREED TO HELP, AND ANEFEEES GOT HIS TELEPHONE. HOWEVER, TWO YEARS LATER, ANEFEEES CALLED, COMPLAINING THAT THE LINE HAD BEEN CUT. WHEN RAMADAN CALLED THE TELEPHONE COMPANY, HE LEARNED THAT ANEFEEES HAD NOT PAID HIS BILL, WHICH WAS BY THEN MORE THAN ONE MILLION DINARS. RAMADAN TOOK CARE OF THE BILL AND ANEFEEES GOT HIS TELEPHONE SERVICE BACK.

(b)(3):50 USC 403-1(i) C. (C) [REDACTED] ANEFEEES IS ESSENTIALLY A GOOD, HONEST, VERY STRONG SUPPORTER OF HUSSEIN AND THE BA'ATH GOVERNMENT. HE WAS RESPECTED BY PROVINCIAL GOVERNORS AND REGIME LEADERSHIP. HE WAS ONE OF THE FEW TRIBAL LEADERS WHO WAS NOT CORRUPT. ANEFEEES WAS ILLITERATE. [REDACTED] (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

[REDACTED] IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER SOURCE MEANT ANEFEEES WAS COMPLETELY ILLITERATE, OR JUST UNEDUCATED OR PRACTICALLY ILLITERATE). ANEFEEES IS OLD, BUT ENJOYS DRINKING ALCOHOL AND DANCING WITH GYPSIES. [REDACTED] (b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)

(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC 424,1.4 (c)